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THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST Two:
ETHEL AND JULIUS ROSENBERG'S
TRIAL
It is important that the country be protected against the nefarious
plans of spies who would destroy us. It is also important that
before we allow human lives to be snuffed out we be sure -
emphatically sure - that we act within the law.
Justice Douglas'
In January 2003 as the United States was preparing to invade
Iraq, the two-week trial of accused spy Brian Patrick Regan2 came
to a close. Regan was arrested in August 2001 in Dulles Interna-
tional Airport on charges of attempting to sell classified military
data to Iraq, Libya, and China. At the time of his arrest, he was
found to have hidden in his shoes encrypted coordinates of a sur-
face-to-air missile site in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq where
U.S. and British warplanes regularly patrolled. 3 He also had coor-
dinates of a missile site in China and addresses of the Chinese and
Iraqi embassies in Europe. During Regan's trial, prosecutors read
from a letter he had written to Saddam Hussein asking for thirteen
million dollars in exchange for military secrets. They put on ex-
perts who testified that the information he was hoping to sell
would damage the United States and argued that the "keyword is
intent." And although Regan's attempts were not successful, he
intended to harm the United States.5  Defense attorneys, in turn,
tried to show that all of Regan's "military secret information" was
available on the Internet and was "worthless." They argued that
his attempt was "a case of bad judgment or stupidity" but one that
I Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 320 (1953) (staying the Rosenbergs' execu-
tion two days before they were electrocuted.)
2 Regan is a former Air Force sergeant and a forty-year old father of four. He pleaded
not guilty to three counts of attempted espionage and one count of mishandling classified infor-
mation. See Tom Jackman, Execution Possibility Intensifies Spy Trial; Jury Selection Opens In
Landmark Case, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 2003, at B01.
3 See Tabassum Zakaria, U.S. Espionage Trial Accused: Spy or Bumbler?, REUTERS, Jan.
27, 2003, available at http://www.reuters.com/newsArticle.jhtml?type=top
News&storylD=2118940 (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
4 Id.
5 Id.
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would "not have harmed the national security of the United
States."6
Regan's indictment did not allege any important security leaks
because he never succeeded in passing along classified information
to foreign governments. But in the wake of September 11, 2001,
Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that Regan would face
the death penalty. With that announcement, Regan became the
first espionage defendant to face execution since Julius and Ethel
Rosenberg were put to death fifty years ago for passing U.S.
atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.
The new war on terrorism with its resultant wave of patriot-
ism, heightened secrecy surrounding issues of national security,
anti-Iraq sentiment, and the government's logic of good versus evil
conjures up an atmosphere similar to the one during the Cold War
when the Rosenbergs were tried. Given the government's past ten-
dency to bend or break the rules to serve its own purposes, the
government's tactics in bringing to trial such high profile defen-
dants should be under special scrutiny. Compared to the Rosen-
bergs, and as a testament to the past fifty years' expansion of pro-
cedural due process safeguards, Regan was afforded a more even-
handed trial, and the jury spared his life.7 But we must ensure that
we do not take steps back towards an era of governmental secrecy
and manipulation of the media that may fuel national hysteria and
result in a violation of the defendants' right to a fair trial under the
Constitution. Examination of the Rosenbergs trial reveals what
could, and did, go wrong.
This Comment reviews the Rosenbergs' trial proceedings.
Special emphasis is placed on those aspects of the trial that have
raised passionate concerns among commentators for five decades,
such as the effect of the adverse publicity and general political at-
mosphere on the trial; the government's heavy reliance on the tes-
timony of confessed spies who had strong motives to lie and were
susceptible to great influence by the government; the exaggeration
of the transmitted information as "The Secret" of the atomic bomb;
the overall weak case against Ethel Rosenberg; the government's
use of Ethel's arrest and final execution as leverage to induce
Julius to confess; the disproportionate sentences handed down (es-
pecially with regards to Ethel); the expedited appeals process; and
the Supreme Court's repeated refusal to review the case.
6 Id.
I See Jerry Markon, Convicted Spy Won't Get Death Penalty; Regan Prosecutors Didn't
Prove Serious Potential Harm, One Juror Says, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2003, at BO1, available
at 2003 WL 13334648.
1058 [Vol. 53:1057
THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST TWO
I. BACKGROUND TO THE ROSENBERG CASE
In 1945, World War II ended with America and the Soviet
8Union as allies, but by 1946 the Cold War had started. America
was confident that the Soviets could not make an atomic bomb, but
in 1949, President Truman shocked the public by announcing that
an atomic explosion had occurred in the Soviet Union. Wide-
spread panic enveloped the U.S. On June 25, 1950, North Korea
launched a surprise attack on South Korea to which the United
States responded immediately with military force. Also in 1950, a
Russian communist spy list found in Germany was decoded; it re-
vealed the name of Klaus Fuchs, a German born nuclear physicist
who was designated by England to go to Los Alamos and cooper-
ate with the U.S. effort to build an atomic bomb. Fuchs was ar-
rested in England and confessed to transmitting atomic information
to the Soviet Union. He was tried and sentenced to fourteen years
in prison. He named Harry Gold as one of his couriers. Gold was
arrested in the U.S. and in his confession implicated David
Greenglass. When arrested, Greenglass confessed that he had en-
gaged in espionage at the invitation of his sister and her husband,
Ethel and Julius Rosenberg. 9  The FBI deduced that two of
Rosenberg's classmates, Max Elitcher and Morton Sobell, were
part of a spy ring. They arrested Elitcher, who confessed and im-
plicated Julius Rosenberg and Sobell.
Julius and Ethel were arrested. Sobell, on "vacation" in Mex-
ico, was abducted by Mexican secret police, "deported" across the
border, and arrested. The Rosenbergs and Sobell were charged
with "conspiracy to commit wartime espionage."' After a trial
8 The following summary is excerpted from BERNARD RYAN, JR., GREAT AMERICAN
TRIALS 452-56 (Edward W. Knappman, ed., 1994).
9 Julius Rosenberg was an electric engineer. Between 1940 and 1945, he worked for the
Army Signal Corps. In 1945, he was dismissed on charges of Communism. He took a job at
the New York plant of the Emerson Radio Company, where he had done some of his work for
Signal Corps. After the war, he started a small machine shop with his brother-in-law, David
Greenglass, who became a foreman, stockholder, officer, and director of the company. The
business went through periods of modest success and financial difficulty until 1950 when
Rosenberg was arrested. Towards the end, there was considerable friction between Greenglass
and Rosenberg, and Greenglass left the business in 1949. The Rosenbergs lived in the Knicker-
bocker Village, a low-cost housing project in lower Manhattan. See MALCOLM P. SHARPE,
WAS JUSTICE DONE? THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE 45-46 (1956).
'0 The Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §32(a) (1946) read:
Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the in-
jury of the United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, commu-
nicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another
to, communicate, deliver, or transmit, to any foreign government .... ei-
ther directly or indirectly, any document, writing, code book, signal
book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blue print, plan, map,
model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to national
2003] 1059
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lasting three weeks, Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were convicted
and sentenced to death. They were executed two years later, be-
coming the only persons ever put to death in America for such a
crime.
II. SUMMARY OF THE TRIAL
The trial of Julius and Ethel Rosenberg started on March 6,
1951.11 The main prosecutors were Irving Saypol,1
2 Roy Cohn,13
and James Kilsheimer III. The defense attorneys were Emanuel
Bloch 14 (for Julius) and Alexander Bloch 15 (for Ethel).
The first witness was Max Elitcher. He had been a high
school friend of Sobell and the man who had induced Sobell to
join the Young Communist League.' 6 He was a junior engineer in
the Navy's Bureau of Ordinance between 1938 and 1944. He testi-
fied that Julius had approached him to leak out information from
the Bureau of Ordinance and that Julius had told him that Sobell
was also giving him information. 17  Elitcher's cross-examination
did not produce any major inconsistencies.18
defense, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than twenty
years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection
(a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or by im-
prisonment for not more than thirty years.
II The following summary concerns only evidence presented against the Rosenbergs.
Several other witnesses and pieces of evidence admitted against Morton Sobell are not discussed
here. Citations to the Trial Transcript refer to the eight-volume version of the trial transcript
reprinted by the National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case, which accompa-
nied the petition for writ of certiorari in 1952. Excerpts of the trial transcript are available at
http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/rosenb/ROSENB.HTM [hereinafter Trial
Transcript].
12 Saypol had already won convictions against Alger Hiss, William Remington, and the
eleven communist leaders tried under the Smith Act. Time magazine had dubbed him "the
nation's number one legal hunter of Communists." Later, he became a Justice of the Supreme
Court of New York. See Ted Morgan, The Rosenberg Jury, ESQUIRE, May 1975, at 105, 107-
08.
13 Cohn later became counsel for the McCarthy Committee.
14 Emanuel ("Manny") Bloch specialized in civil rights cases and had defended several
Communists. During and after the trial, he became emotionally engrossed in the Rosenberg
case. He took care of the Rosenberg children while their parents were in prison and brought
them for monthly visits to the death house. He later fought for the children's placement with the
appropriate foster parents. He devoted all his energy to saving his clients' lives. His emotional
involvement was so complete that he died only several months after the Rosenbergs' execution
at the age of 44. See LouIs NIZER, THE IMPLOSION CONSPIRACY 1-2 (1973).
15 Alexander Bloch was Emanuel's father. At seventy-four, he was a business lawyer
specializing in the sale of bakeries. He had never practiced criminal law. See Morgan, supra
note 12, at 108.
16 Max Elitcher's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 197-394. Most of
Elitcher's testimony implicated Morton Sobell, and in fact the entire case against Sobell rested
on Elitcher's testimony. See RONALD RADOSH & JOYCE MILTON, THE ROSENBERG FILE: A
SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH 175 (1997).
,7 Id. at 175-77. The most dramatic part of his testimony was the recital of a nighttime
drive to Catherine Slip; Elitcher had gone to Sobell's house while being followed by the FBI.
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The two key witnesses against the Rosenbergs were David
Greenglass, Ethel Rosenberg's brother, and Ruth Greenglass, his
wife. David Greenglass had been a machinist at Los Alamos, New
Mexico, where the Manhattan Project was underway to make the
first atomic bomb. He recounted 9 how in November 1944 his
wife Ruth had asked him, at Julius's insistence, to leak information
out of Los Alamos in order to help the Soviet Union, an ally of the
United States.20  David agreed with this reasoning because as he
explained, he had a kind of "hero worship" for Julius Rosenberg.2 l
He started by giving Julius a general description of the Los Ala-
mos facility and the names of the scientists working there. Later,
he drew sketches of the implosion lens molds used to detonate the
atomic bomb and another sketch and a twelve-page description of
the implosion-type A-bomb used at Nagasaki. 22 He drew four
sketches from memory during the trial. At this point, in a dramatic
move, defense counsel asked that Exhibit 8, the cross-sectional
sketch of the Nagasaki bomb, be impounded.23 Then an expert
took the stand and testified that the sketches were essentially accu-
rate; he explained the principle of "implosion" and the fact that it
was a secret at the time.24  The sketches and accompanying de-
scription were considered to be the true "secret of the atom bomb."
David testified about a certain console table that the Rosen-
bergs owned. This table, according to Greenglass, was a gift from
the Russians to expedite Julius's spy activities and was modified to
make it suitable for microfilming.25 The table was never produced
at trial.26 David also described how Julius had cut the side of a
Jell-O box so that the two halves could be used as a recognition
signal when a contact was sent to retrieve information from
Sobell, after expressing much anger at his friend's lack of caution, drove to Catherine Slip to
deliver a can of film to Rosenberg. Elitcher never saw Rosenberg on that occasion. He saw only
that Sobell left with the can of microfilm and returned without it.
"S Id. at 177-78.
19 David Greenglass's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 394-430, 438-66,
489-500, and 510-76.
20 NIZER, supra note 14, at 75-77. According to Ruth Greenglass, Julius had said that
"[tlhe United States and Britain are working on the atom bomb project but they are not sharing
with our most valuable ally, Russia.... [But] if all nations had the information, then one nation
couldn't use the bomb as a threat against another." Ruth later testified that during the same
conversation, Ethel Rosenberg had interjected that David has a chance to prevent a third world
war and that he can help create a balance of power to preserve peace. Id. at 77.
21 Id. at 114.
22 Id. at 78-79.
23 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 188.
24 NIZER, supra note 14, at 83-88.
25 Id. at 231.
26 The table was later found and formed the basis for an unsuccessful appeal for a new
trial. See infra text accompanying notes 211-12 for a discussion of the fate of this appeal.
2003] 1061
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David.27 He testified that he gave an envelop containing six to
seven pages of written information as well as the sketches of the
implosion lens mold to Harry Gold, the contact who had appeared
with the cut half of the Jell-O box.28 He recounted how Julius
came to see him upon hearing that Fuchs was arrested, gave him
$4,000 wrapped in a brown paper bag, and urged him to take six
sets of passport photographs and flee to Mexico. David, however,
had decided against flight and was arrested by the FBI. He used
the $4,000 to retain a lawyer.29 David's wife, Ruth, corroborated
her husband's testimony. 30 She also added that Ethel was present
when the Jell-O box had been cut up and that Ethel had typed
David's handwritten reports.31
Next, Harry Gold, a spy who had already been convicted and
32
sentenced to thirty years, took the stand. He had been the courier
between the "master" Russian spy, Anatoli Yakovlev, and Fuchs
and David Greenglass. He testified how he had received orders
from Yakovlev to go to New Mexico to meet a new contact, David
Greenglass, with the cut half of the Jell-O box and the recognition
signal "I come from Julius." 33 He had received an envelope con-
taining information from David and had given it to Yakovlev.
Also, David had given Gold a New York telephone number
(Julius's) so that Gold could contact David during his next fur-
lough in New York.34 The defense counsel did not cross-examine
Gold.
The prosecution's glamorous star witness was Elizabeth Bent-
ley, former fascist turned communist "spy extraordinaire,'35 turned
FBI informant and double agent; she was dubbed the "Red Spy
Queen."'36 She testified37 that as a confidential assistant to Jacob
Golos when he was chief of espionage operations in the U.S., she
had received various phone calls from a man called "Julius" who
was an engineer living in the Knickerbocker Village. She also
provided her "expert" opinion that the American Communist Party
was subordinate to Communist International and received orders
27 NIZER, supra note 14, at 79-80.
28 Radosh & Milton, supra note 16, at 70.
29 NIZER, supra note 14, at 97-101.
30 Ruth Greenglass's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 677-787.
31 NIZER, supra note 14, at 119-30.
32 Harry Gold's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 798-848.
33 NIZER, supra note 14, at 157-59.
Id. at 159-60.
35 Id. at 177.
36 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 224.
37 Elizabeth Bentley's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 964-1023.
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from Moscow. This provided a link between being a Communist
and "aiding a foreign nation."
38
The defense's case consisted only of the testimony of Julius
and Ethel Rosenberg. 39 They denied all allegations of espionage
and related activities.40  What attracted everyone's attention, and
their most important tactical decision, was the refusal to answer
any questions relating to their involvement in the Communist Party
on the grounds that it would incriminate them.4' Their testimony
was studded with invocations of the Fifth Amendment. In another
memorable moment, Julius Rosenberg, in response to the prosecu-
tor's questions about his conversation with Greenglass about
money, said that Greenglass had asked him for money and that
when Rosenberg refused to give it to him, Greenglass had "threat-
ened" and "blackmailed" him. These words planted the seed of
doubt in the jurors' minds.42 Ethel testified along the same lines,
refusing to answer questions about the Communist Party.43
During Rosenberg's cross-examination, Saypol learned that
the FBI had found a new surprise witness. 44 His lengthy cross-
examination of Rosenberg was intended to allow time for this wit-
ness to secretly identify the Rosenbergs in the courtroom. Then,
after Julius denied having ever taken a set of passport photographs
of his family in preparation for flight from the country,45 Saypol
announced the existence of his surprise rebuttal witness: the pho-
tographer who had taken the photographs. 46 The photographer tes-
tified47 that Julius and Ethel had gone to his shop for an unusually
large order of three dozen passport-type photos.4  The other rebut-
tal witness was the Rosenberg maid, who testified 49 that Mrs.
Rosenberg had once told her that the console table was a "gift
38 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 227.
39 Julius Rosenberg's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 1051-1199, 1282-86
and 1307-10; Ethel Rosenberg's Testimony, id. at 1293-1402.
40 For example, Julius denied receiving a console table from the Russians, especially
outfitted for microfilming, and ever giving Ruth $150 to help pay for her trip to New Mexico to
convince David to commit espionage. He testified that he had never received information from
David about the atom bomb, never introduced David to a man who asked for details of the
bomb, and never introduced Ann Sidorovich to David as an espionage courier. RADOSH &
MILTON, supra note 16, at 238-39. According to Rosenberg, the Jell-O box incidence never
happened, and he had visited Max Elitcher in Washington during a routine business trip when
he had felt lonely and looked up a college acquaintance he had not seen for years. Id. at 241.
41 See NIZER, supra note 14, at 223-29.
42 See Morgan, supra note 12, at 128.
43 See NIZER, supra note 14, at 241-59 (excerpting Ethel Rosenberg's testimony).
,4 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 250-51.
45 Id. at 251.
46 The photographer's name, Ben Schneider, was not on the prosecution witness list.
47 Ben Schneider's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 1424-40.
48 NIZER, supra note 14, at 278-83.
49 Evelyn Cox's testimony, Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 1406-12.
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from a friend" and that the table was kept in a closet even though it
was the finest piece of furniture in the Rosenberg home.5°
After summation51 and the judge's charge, the jury deliberated
for most of the evening, and at 11:00 a.m. the next day, it returned
a verdict of guilty for all three defendants. Judge Kaufman sen-
tenced Julius and Ethel Rosenberg to death and Sobell to thirty
years in prison.52
The Rosenbergs' trial and their subsequent executions at-
tracted furious debate between those who believed that the Rosen-
bergs were framed by the government and received an unfair
trial,53 and those who believed that the spies who had given the
Soviets "the secret" of the atomic bomb were responsible for the
deaths of thousands of American soldiers in North Korea and de-
served to die. 54 In 1975, pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act,55 the secret documents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Department of Justice
(DOJ), Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), and U.S. Army Intel-
ligence were released and put yet another light on the proceedings
before, during, and after the trial.56 They revealed that although
Julius was a spy, the atomic information he passed onto the Rus-
sians was of very little value. 57 Furthermore, Ethel had a minor
role, if any, in Julius's espionage activities. The government was
aware of both of these facts at the time of trial and still sought the
death penalty, mainly to get Julius to confess. 58 Julius's refusal to
cooperate with the government put an end to the government's
hunt for Soviet spies.
5) NIZER, supra note 14, at 275-77.
51 Unlike the accepted modem day practice, defense counsel had to go first and prosecu-
tion had the last word.
52 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 284-85.
53 See generally ROBERT MEEROPOL & MICHAEL MEEROPOL, WE ARE YOUR SONS: THE
LEGACY OF ETHEL AND JULIUS ROSENBERG (1975); WILLIAM A. REUBENS, THE ATOM SPY
HOAX (1955); WALTER SCHNEIR & MIRIAM SCHNEIR, INVITATION TO AN INQUEST: A NEW
LOOK AT THE ROSENBERG-SOBELL CASE (1968); JOHN WEXLEY, THE JUDGMENT OF JULIUS
AND ETHEL ROSENBERG (1977); Micheal E. Parrish, Cold War Justice: Tile Supreme Court aild
The Rosenbergs, 82 AM. HIST. REV. 805 (1977).
54 See, e.g., NIZER, supra note 14, at 485-95 (maintaining that the government's case had
been compelling, and the defendants were extended "every protection of the democratic process
of justice: jury trial, legal counsel, right of defense and appeal .... [A] tribute to the thorough
legal processes afforded by American jurisprudence); see also LESLIE A. FIEDLER, AN END TO
INNOCENCE (1955).
55 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2000).
56 For an account of the contents of these voluminous records in the context of the trial see
RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16.
57 See infra Part V for a discussion of the significance of the scientific information.
58 See infra Part VI for a discussion of the evidence against Ethel Rosenberg.
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III. NEWS COVERAGE" 9 AND BIAS
A. Anti-Communism Sentiment
The Rosenbergs' case came at the height of anti-communist
hysteria in America when fear of Communists and communism
was widespread. The people of the United States were told that a
vast Communist conspiracy at home and abroad was trying to sub-
vert and overthrow the American government. In 1946, Winston
Churchill made his famous "iron curtain" speech. In 1947, Presi-
dent Truman instituted a federal loyalty program 60 that required
extensive background investigations of all federal workers and the
dismissal of those found to be "disloyal." Communist Party mem-
bership, even "sympathetic association" with the Party, was prima
facie evidence of disloyalty and mandated dismissal.61 In 1948,
the first Smith Act indictments of leaders of the U.S. Communist
Party were handed down. In 1950, the Korean War broke out, and
Senator Joseph McCarthy made his "I hold here in my hand a list"
speech claiming communist infiltration of the State Department.61
In this atmosphere:
[t]o be a Communist, know a Communist, or to have had the
slightest association with the American Communist Party
quickly became the secular equivalent of consorting with the
devil. In this new religion of anti-communism, redemption
was possible only through the public act of informing, by re-
nouncing one's previous political beliefs and naming
names.
From the outset of the trial, the prosecutor launched into a line
of argument designed to appeal to the jury's feelings about Com-
munism. In his opening statement, Saypol stated "the evidence
will show that the loyalty and the allegiance of the Rosenbergs...
were not to our country, but that it was to Communism, Commu-
59 For a full discussion and analysis of the news coverage of the Rosenberg case, how the
government managed the press, and its effect on the trial and its aftermath, see JOHN F.
NEVILLE, THE PRESS, THE ROSENBERGS, AND THE COLD WAR (1995).
60 The President's Loyalty Order, Exec. Order No. 9,835, 12 C.F.R. 1935 (March 25,
1947), revoked by Exec. Order No. 10,450, 18 C.F.R. 2489 (April 29, 1953).
61 See ILENE PHILIPSON, ETHEL ROSENBERG: BEYOND THE MYTHS 198 (1988).
62 See Jesse Friedman, The Fight For America: Senator Joseph McCarthy,
http://mccarthy.cjb.net (quoting McCarthy's first speech against Communism before the Repub-
lican Women's Club in Wheeling, West Virginia, on February 9, 1950. It started with: "I have
in my hand a list of 205 cases of individuals who appear to be either card-carrying members or
certainly loyal to the Communist Party") (last modified August 27, 2000).
63 PHILIPSON, supra note 61, at 199.
10652003]
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nism in this country and throughout the world." 64 Bloch objected
to this theme, stating that remarks about Communism were irrele-
vant because "Communism is not on trial here. 65  But Judge
Kaufman allowed testimony about the defendant's belief in Com-
munism in order to establish their motivation.66 Saypol continued
in this vein during both his direct examination of government wit-
nesses and his cross-examination of Julius and Ethel.67 Saypol
went on to make the case in his closing argument that all of the
defendants had indeed been members of the Communist Party.68
This was perhaps a legitimate inquiry. Although motivation
was not an element of the charge,69 the prosecutors had to show
why an ordinary couple would engage in a conspiracy for a foreign
country. Being a Communist, or even sympathetic to the Soviet
regime, could have provided that motive and, even today, may be a
proper and admissible inquiry. But the deliberate emphasis on
Communism had two effects. First, during the trial whenever
Julius and Ethel were asked about their past communist activities,
both repeatedly took the Fifth Amendment. 70  Ironically, the
64 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 172.
65 Id. at 173.
66 id.
67 Communism and the Young Communist League, to which Rosenberg and several of his
college friends belonged, had been mentioned several times by the prosecutor's witnesses.
During Julius's cross-examination, Saypol directed a stream of questions designed to bring out
the fact that Rosenberg's friends were Communists. Despite Rosenberg's refusal to answer any
questions regarding his own Communist activities (on the grounds that it might incriminate
him), Saypol's line of questioning left no room for doubt regarding what type of activity or
membership in a political group Rosenberg refused to testify about. For example, Saypol asked
Rosenberg about his college friends and whether there was any "club or anything like that" that
Julius and his friends had all belonged to. What group had Rosenberg in mind that made him so
"reticent?" "Is there a group that all of you were active in together, as to which you raise the
question of your constitutional privilege, that you don't want to tell us about?" RADOSH &
MILTON, supra note 16, at 246-47. Then, when Bloch objected to this line of questioning, and
Saypol was searching for a word that would be acceptable to the court, Rosenberg interjected
that "if Mr. Saypol is referring to the Young Communist League of the Communist Party, I will
not answer any question on it." Id. Saypol continued to make the point indirectly during his
cross of Ethel. Indeed, he asked Ethel whether she had helped David join the Communist Party
when there was no indication that David had actually ever been a member of that party. Id. at2 6 1 .-68 "While Sobell was chairman of his Communist Party unit in Washington, delivering to
its members weekly directives concerning worship of the Soviet Union, Rosenberg was working
his way up in the Communist Party underground." Saypol's Closing Argument, NIZER, supra
note 14, at 109-10. This is only one of several other references to the Rosenbergs' communist
activities. Id. at 310-19.
69 See supra note 10 for the text of the statute.
70 The first of the many refusals to answer such questions came when Judge Kaufman
asked Julius whether he had ever belonged to "any group" that had discussed the system of
government in Russia. Julius answered "[Wlell your Honor, are you referring to political
groups - is that what you are referring to?" The judge replied "Any group." Rosenberg re-
sponded, "Well you Honor, I feel at this time that I refuse to answer a question that might tend
to incriminate me." RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 241.
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Rosenbergs' invocation of the Fifth Amendment had a more dele-
terious effect on the jurors and has long been viewed as a grave
tactical error.7' In an interview by Ted Morgan, one of the jurors
recalled that "[t]hey used the Fifth so damn many times. They
must have thought it would be very damaging not to take it."
72
Another juror reminisced that "to me it meant they were hiding
something, even though it was their constitutional privilege.,
73
Second, the repeated references to Communism could be seen as
an appeal to the public's and the jury's anti-communist feelings.
If one juror is to be believed, the judge himself influenced the
jury during the trial. By coincidence, when the Rosenberg trial
was in its final week, a famous trial of several underworld crimi-
nals was under way in the same courthouse. These criminals also
took the Fifth whenever they were asked about their ties to organ-
ized crime. One day, according to one juror, Judge Kaufman
cleared the court and brought in Senator Charles Tobey who im-
pressed upon the jury the connection between the gangsters and the
Rosenbergs and their invocation of the Fifth Amendment.74
B. Saypol and the Media
Saypol was a well-known media hound.75 He held informal
press conferences in his office every day after court, and his every
word had the potential of making front-page news. An astute
prosecutor, Saypol knew how to "frame" the case for the news
media so as to keep it in the headlines.76 On the other hand, only
two out of a sample of national papers reported on the defense
lawyer's opening statements.77 Even the request by Bloch that the
court impound Exhibit 8.went conspicuously unreported.78
In a thorough analysis of the news media coverage of the
Rosenberg case, John Neville states that "[t]here have been many
famous trials in the American history, but agenda setting, gate
keeping, news media black-outs, and patriotism make the Rosen-
71 The defense strategy has been much criticized on other grounds. For example, Radosh
& Milton make the point that "the absence of a single friendly witness" to corroborate
Rosenberg's version of events or to provide support of Rosenberg's character "was striking."
Id. at 244. However, it was later said that the Rosenbergs wanted to spare their many friends the
persecution that would have inevitably followed anyone who spoke on their behalf. Id. at 241.
72 See Morgan, supra note 12, at 127.
73 Id.
74 Id. at 128.
75 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 99; see also NEVILLE, supra note 59.
76 See NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 35-5 1, for a discussion of the agenda setting role of
Saypol's tactics and news coverage of the trial.
77 Id. at 36.
78 Id. at 40.
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bergs' case unique because this phenomena occurred in an epoch
of political ferocity that time has not diminished. 79 Neville used a
systematic documentary analysis of the content of twelve national
newspapers, four newsweekly news magazines, and eleven other
local and international newspapers and periodicals. 80 The newspa-
pers almost exclusively printed the FBI and DOJ's version of the
stories without questioning their sources, starting with a press re-
lease from FBI Director Hoover and Attorney General McGrath.81
Moreover, the newspapers were selective and often inaccurate
about what they printed. Despite the enormous publicity the case
engendered, the jury was never sequestered, and although it was
under strict instructions not to read newspapers, it is difficult to
believe that each and every one of the jurors remained ignorant of
headline news. One member of the Rosenberg jury later recalled:
"You can shut yourself off to a certain extent, but I'd be riding the
subway, and I'm a guy that likes to read sports, you're bound to
see a newspaper .... [A]nyone who tells you he can shut himself
off completely during a trial has never served on a jury. 82
One of Saypol's press releases in particular caught the atten-
tion of the trial's critics. On the same day that Bloch was sched-
uled to cross-examine Ruth Greenglass, newspapers across the
country announced the arrest of William Perl, a suspected spy and
classmate and friend of Julius Rosenberg.83 Perl was formally
charged with perjury for having lied to the grand jury by denying
that he ever knew Julius, but Saypol went on to tell the press that
Perl was listed by the government as a potential witness in the
Rosenberg trial and that Perl's intended role was to corroborate
79 Id. at 8.
80 Id. at 8.
81 FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover and Attorney General J. Howard McGrath issued a press
release in Washington, D.C., as Julius was hustled up the stairs of the building in Foley Square.
The press release said that the fourth American member of the spy ring had just been arrested in
New York City. NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 16.
82 Morgan, supra note 12, at 124-25.
83 William Perl was suspected of being a member of the wider Rosenberg spy ring. He
was questioned in the summer of 1950 before a grand jury and denied ever knowing Julius
Rosenberg or Morton Sobell. However, the FBI knew about Perl's longstanding friendship with
both men. Since neither the FBI nor the US attorney's office had enough proof to indict Perl for
espionage, he was indicted for perjury. RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 129. The FBI
hoped that Perl would break down and confess under pressure, which would be helpful not only
to the trial of Rosenbergs but the investigation of the spy ring generally. Id. at 204. However, a
few days before his indictment, Saypol's assistant, Roy Cohn, called Perl into his office and in
effect warned Perl that the government was after him for information. This move had the exact
opposite effect. Perl consulted a lawyer, who advised him of his Fifth Amendment rights, and
he refused to divulge any information. Id. at 205. The FBI's only hope of convicting Perl for
espionage was if Rosenberg confessed. Since this did not happen, Perl was only tried for per-
jury and served 5 years. Id. at 302-03.
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certain statements made by a key government witness.84  The next
day, Edward Kuntz, Sobell's defense counsel, lodged a complaint
about the inappropriate newspaper headline. 85  However, after an
in camera conference with Saypol and the judge, the defense at-
torneys decided not to take this up further. 86 There was no motion
for a mistrial, and the jurors were never asked whether they had
actually seen the newspaper headline. As a result of this conces-
sion, defense counsel lost its chance to use Saypol's statement to
the newspapers as grounds for appeal. 87 The district court's opin-
ion stated that "[t]he petitioners did bring the matter of Perl's
indictment before the trial judge but they elected not to move for a
mistrial; they may not now object., 88  While characterizing Say-
pol's statement to the press as "wholly reprehensible," the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals, nevertheless, affirmed the trial court's
rejection of a new trial based on the Perl incident.89
Not only was Saypol aware of the influence of the media gen-
erally, he specifically used the media to his tactical advantage.
Arresting Perl during trial for denying under oath that he knew
Julius Rosenberg may have been a tacit attempt to influence the
jurors, the implication being that the government had expected to
use Perl's testimony to corroborate the Greenglasses', but that be-
cause Perl had backed out, he had been indicted for perjury.90
Neville describes Saypol's conduct regarding the Perl arrest as "an
agenda-setting coup par excellence," which grabbed front-page
headlines coast to coast." 9' Another prosecution tactic was to
place the names of top scientists, such as Robert Oppenheimer
(wartime scientific director at Los Alamos), Harold Urey (Nobel
8 The New York Times ran side-by-side articles linking Pert to the Rosenberg trial: front-
page headlines read "Columbia Teacher Arrested, Linked to 2 on Trial as Spies" and
"Greenglass Wife Backs His Testimony as Theft of Atom Bomb Secrets." NEVILLE, supra note
59, at 42.
85 Kuntz complained that "I have never before tried a case in the newspapers in my life."
RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 26.
86 Manny Bloch later stated that the defense's failure to move for a mistrial right there and
then was based on Saypol's assurances that the indictment and press release were not deliber-
ately timed to affect the trial. See SHARPE, supra note 9, at 108.
87 To make matters worse, Julius Rosenberg, when testifying, referred to the newspaper
article. When asked by the prosecutor whether he knew William Perl, Rosenberg replied that he
had read in the newspapers "about a man being arrested for perjury," that his name was men-
tioned, and so he should "refuse to answer any question that might tend to incriminate" him.
Thus, since Julius had informed the jurors of Pert's arrest, the defense could not later claim that
the jurors' knowledge had prejudiced his case. See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 245.
88 U.S. v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798, 804 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
89 U.S. v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 670 (2d Cir. 1952) (affirming Ryan's dismissal of the
petition because there was "no allegation or evidence that any juror read the newspaper story
and the defendants deliberately elected not to ask for a mistrial.").
90 Id.
91 NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 41.
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laureate and professor of nuclear science at the University of Chi-
cago) and George Kistiakowski (former Manhattan Project physi-
cist and Harvard University chemistry professor) on the witness
list.92 None of them appeared at trial, indeed Urey was not even
aware that his name was on the list, but the move implied that
these scientists were in agreement with the government's scientific
interpretation of the case.93 Because the media accepted the gov-
ernment's version of events without investigating or even report-
ing the opposition's claims, it gave the government an incentive to
use the press to its advantage. It is also worth remembering that
"the news media have no foolproof filtration system for the elimi-
nation of government bias, distortion, manipulation, or propa-
ganda." 94
IV. THE TESTIMONIES
Almost the entire case against the Rosenbergs was based on
the testimony of David and Ruth Greenglass, but they had a strong
motivation for cooperating with the government, overstating the
events, and even lying. For example, Ruth was a member of the
conspiracy and could have been indicted at any moment. In addi-
tion, the Greenglasses had long-term financial disagreements with
the Rosenbergs, and David himself faced the death penalty as a
member of the atomic espionage ring. Despite the defense's at-
tempts to discredit their testimony by pointing out that they were
betraying their kin to save their own skin, the jurors bought the
Greenglasses' version of events precisely because to do something
as terrible as testifying against one's own sister and brother-in-
law, the Greenglasses had to be telling the truth.95
After the release of the FBI files, however, two key pieces of
testimony by the Greenglasses have caused much concern. One is
the last-minute alignment of the testimonies of David Greenglass
and Gold about the pass-phrase that Gold had used when he met
David. The other is the Greenglasses' sudden recollection of the
fact that Ethel had typed the information David had given Julius.
92 Id. at 33 (citing FBI Heads Alerts Nation on Security, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1951, at 5;
Spy Trial to Hear 3 Atom Scientists, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 1951, at 14).
93 Id. See also infra notes 153-58 and accompanying text for these scientists' views on the
importance of the scientific information leaked by Greenglass.
94 NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 142.
95 Morgan, supra note 12, at 127.
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A. "I come from Julius"
During the trial, David Greenglass described how Julius had
cut a Jell-O box in half so that the two halves could be used as a
recognition signal when a contact was sent to retrieve information
from David. He then testified that it was Harry Gold who turned
up at his apartment with Rosenberg's cut half of the Jell-O box
using the pass-phrase "I come from Julius., 96 Gold corroborated
this testimony. Since Gold had been sent by Yakovlev and got
his half of the Jell-O box from Yakovlev himself, this was the only
piece of evidence that connected Julius with Gold and Yakovlev.
The phrase "I come from Julius" aroused suspicion because
the use of Julius's, or any other agent's, real name as a code was
highly unlikely. Furthermore, there is evidence that the FBI essen-
tially suggested to Gold that that was the phrase he used. Three
months before trial, Gold and Greenglass were brought together in
an effort to "iron out" the differences between their testimonies.
98
On December 28, 1950, Gold and Greenglass were interviewed
jointly in the hope that Gold could obtain "their concentrated effort
in recalling" certain details. 99 Problems arose when Greenglass
and Gold had a different recollection of the password Gold had
used. Gold's initial recollection was that he had brought greetings
from "Ben in Brooklyn,"' ° but Greenglass did not remember the
name "Ben," and in his statement to his attorney said "I didn't
know who sent Gold to me."''° However, after several more inter-
views, and just before the trial began, Gold became "quite certain"
that on the day of his meeting with Greenglass he had brought
greetings from "Julius."
10 2
That the FBI planted the phrase "I come from Julius" in
Gold's mind is further suggested by FBI agent Richard Brennan,
who was present at the joint interview and later insisted that feed-
ing a name to a witness "was not wrong as such" and that in any
case the FBI "didn't plant that idea in Gold's mind . . . it was
given to him as a suggestion."
10 3
96 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
97 See supra text accompanying note 33.
98 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 160.
99 Id.
1oo See NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 31.
101 SHARPE, supra note 9, at 194.
102 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 162.
103 Id. (quoting Richard Brennan during an interview with the filmmaker Alvin Goldstein).
Another inconsistent piece of testimony was that he had signed the hotel register in Albuquer-
que in his own name, a seemingly incredible move by a seasoned espionage agent. The govern-
ment corroborated this by producing the hotel registration card. The registration card itself has
been viewed as one of the more suspicious pieces of evidence in the case. The proponent of the
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Given these facts, the defense counsel's failure to cross-
examine Gold was undoubtedly a mistake. Under pressure, Gold
might have admitted that he had originally recalled bringing greet-
ings from "Ben in Brooklyn." '04 Moreover, the phrase was an un-
necessary duplication since he already had the cut Jell-O box sig-
nal. The defense could also have minimized the importance of
David Greenglass's information by making Gold elaborate on the
information he had received from Klaus Fuchs, a physicist with a
much better understanding of the atomic bomb.' 5  Finally, six
months earlier in the trial of accused spy Abe Brothman, Gold had
admitted that he had fabricated a series of lies about having a wife,
twin children, and a brother killed in military action.10 6 Since the
transcript of that trial was available, Gold could at best have been
impeached using his prior testimony or at worst been shown to be
a "practiced liar."'
0 7
Had the trial occurred a decade later, we can speculate as to
whether the prosecution would have had to turn over this informa-
tion under the more liberal rules of criminal procedure, in particu-
lar Brady v. Maryland0 8 and the Jencks Act, 10 9 which require
broad disclosures by the prosecution. But the question remains
whether then, as now, the political climate might have influenced
the quality and quantity of such disclosures.
B. Ethel's Typing
The prosecution's case against Ethel was very weak until
Ruth and David Greenglass "remembered" something that placed
her in the eye of the spy ring. 11° At an FBI "interview" about a
Rosenbergs' innocence theorized, credibly, that the card was forged by the FBI. See SCHNEIR &
SCHNEIR, supra note 53, at 378-91; WEXLEY, supra note 53, at 328-33. However, with the
release of FBI files, the card seems to have been authentic after all. See RADOSH & MILTON,
supra note 16, at 455-70.
1(m Radosh & Milton speculate that Bloch may have taken this course after consulting with
Julius Rosenberg, who might have told Bloch that Gold could supply further damaging testi-
mony, for example their meeting in the Queens subway station. RADOSH & MILTON, supra note
16, at 216.
105 See infra note 159 and accompanying text for a discussion of the importance of Fuchs's
information.
1o6 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 34-37.
107 NIZER, supra note 14, at 164.
108 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (mandating the disclosure of exculpatory evidence by the prosecu-
tion).
'- 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000). The Jencks Act, and later Rule 26.2 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure, mostly codified the decision in Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657, 668
(1957), and provided that after a government witness has testified on direct, the court should, on
motion of the defendants, order the government to produce any statement relating to the subject
matter of his testimony.
110 See infra Part VI for a discussion of the case against Ethel Rosenberg.
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week before start of trial, Ruth "volunteered additional informa-
tion" about Ethel.' Ruth said that in September 1945, when
David gave his handwritten notes and sketches of the lens mold to
Julius in the Rosenberg's living room, Ethel, at Julius's command,
"sat down at the typewriter which she had placed on a bridge table
in the living room and proceeded to type the info which David had
given to Julius.""12 Two days later, David Greenglass "furnished
in substance the same information as related by Ruth
Greenglass.",13
The prosecutors explained the late appearance of this informa-
tion as the Greenglasses' desire to shield Ethel. According to Kil-
sheimer, David gradually broke down under pressure and gave ad-
ditional information." 4  However, the FBI files show that rather
than a gradual disgorgement of information, this "additional in-
formation" was a flat-out contradiction of the earlier account of the
same incident given by David Greenglass in a statement dated July
1951. According to that statement, David had given his notes and
the sketches to Julius "on the street somewhere in the city." ' 15 Up
to this interview, David had also consistently maintained that Ethel
was not present in any of the occasions when David gave Julius
information." 6  Recent interviews with the Greenglasses did not
erase these doubts since they seemed unable to recall the details of
the "typing episode" despite the fact that they had vivid memories
of other conversations and incidents."1
7
There is evidence that Gold's readiness to testify that he had
carried greetings from "Julius" and David and Ruth's testimony
about Ethel's typing made the prosecution's task much easier and
led to a shorter, more efficient trial strategy."18
H' RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 163.
112 Id. at 164 (quoting from a FBI cablegram to FBI Director Hoover, summarizing the
contents of these interviews.) Interestingly, the FBI files contain only summaries of these late
interviews; earlier interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. Id.
113 Id.
"4 Id. (citing a recent interview with Kilsheimer in his private practice office in New
York).
115 Id. at 164 (quoting from a July 17, 1951, statement describing the September 1945
transaction).
116 Id. at 165.
117 Id. at 165-66. To explain how the suggestion that Ethel had typed David's notes came
about, Radosh & Milton propose the following hypothetical: during interviews of David and
Ruth someone asked them "who typed the material" in terms that suggested that it was known
that someone had typed the data, and that in an effort to deny that it was Ruth, Ruth or David
could have said "it must have been Ethel" and the other felt pressure to confirm the statement.
Id.
118 Id. at 174-75.
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C. Schneider's Perjury
The prosecution's rebuttal witness, photographer Ben Schnei-
der, was not on the prosecution's witness list. 119 His "discovery"
by the FBI on the penultimate day of the trial was a very conven-
ient coincidence for the prosecution and has long been viewed as
one of the more suspicious elements of the prosecution's case, es-
pecially since he happened to run a business in the neighborhood
of the courthouse that was frequented by federal employees. 20 In
addition, Schnieder committed perjury when he testified that he
had not seen the Rosenbergs since the day he took their photo-
graphs. In fact he had been brought into the courtroom the day
before his testimony to see whether he could identify Ethel and
Julius.121 Counsel for the Rosenbergs contended that the examina-
tion of Schneider constituted the knowing use of perjured testi-
mony by the prosecution. The district court judge held that it was
not on a material point,122 and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
held that prosecution had treated the question as meaning whether
he had seen the Rosenbergs "before the trial."' 23
After the release of the FBI papers, Radosh & Milton ex-
plained how jailhouse informant Jerome Eugene Tartakow gained
Julius's confidence during his detention and later provided the FBI
with the photographer's name. 24 Tartakow's reliability as an in-
formant, however, has been questioned. 25 There is no explanation
as to why Julius would share such incriminating information with
Tartakow, a convicted felon seeking favors from the government.
One theory even suggests that the post-trial FBI memo mentioning
Tartakow's "tip" was prepared to account for the highly suspicious
appearance of Schneider as a "surprise witness" on the very last
day of trial and was designed as "insurance" for the prosecution in
case of an appeal or motion for a new trial by the defense. 26
V. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION
Exactly how important was the Greenglass information to the
Russians? The accuracy and significance of the Greenglass
'9 See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
120 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 265.
121 Id. at 342.
122 Rosenberg v. United States, 108 F. Supp. 798, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
123 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666, 671 (2d Cir. 1952).
124 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 291-93.
125 See WEXLEY, supra note 53, at 231-32; Walter and Miriam Schneir, Letter to the Edi-
tor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 4-11, 1979, at 26 (cited in RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at
534).
126 See WEXLEY, supra note 53, at 486-87.
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sketches and descriptions has been much disputed. The AEC's and
FBI's released files show that before trial the AEC went to great
lengths to establish the accuracy and source of Greenglass's in-
formation.127 The AEC broke down the information in
Greenglass's statements into discrete areas according to its sensi-
tivity: (1) general background information about the layout and the
organization of the Los Alamos facility and the names of the scien-
tists working there; (2) sketches of the lens molds used in implo-
sion experiments; (3) a general description of the bomb type which
had been used at Nagasaki; and (4) a description and sketch of re-
duction experiments designed to reduce the amount of plutonium
or uranium necessary to detonate a bomb. 28 The first two items
were deemed the least sensitive and okay to be used in the trial.
29
Only the lens sketches made their way into the trial transcript,
while the cross-sectional sketch and description of the Nagasaki
bomb were impounded at Bloch's request.'
30
After Greenglass had drawn his sketches from memory, Wal-
ter Koski, a professor of physical chemistry and the AEC's expert
witness, was asked about the importance of the lens mold sketches.
He explained the meaning of "implosion" and "implosion lens."',
31
He then testified that Greenglass's sketches of the lens mold were
"substantially accurate," and that the designs used were "new and
original in 1945" and therefore secret.132 Saypol then asked the
judge to enter into the record a statement that the subject matter of
Koski's testimony had been declassified for the purposes of the
trial and that subsequent to the trial it was to be reclassified.
33
This was an obviously senseless statement since the reclassified
information had just been divulged in an open court full of report-
ers. The statement had the effect of using the AEC to corroborate
and heighten the importance of the information. Defense counsel
decided not to object to this statement, and by doing so, impliedly
admitted that the lens mold sketches were important enough to
merit classification status even in 1951.
Even more incredibly, Bloch asked that Exhibit 8,
Greenglass's sketch and a twelve-page description of the Nagasaki
127 See generally RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 432-49.
128 Id. at 143-44.
'29 Id. at 144.
130 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
131 Koski first explained the difference between explosion, in which the shock waves travel
outward, and an implosion in which "the waves are converging and the energy is concentrating
itself." An implosion lens is a device for shaping charges of explosives so that they would
produce a converging detonation wave. NIZER, supra note 14, at 83-88.
132 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 185.
133 Id. at 186.
10752003]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
bomb, be impounded "so that it remains secret from the Court, the
jury and the counsel," and later requested that Greenglass's testi-
mony about the contents of the twelve-page description "be done
in camera without the spectators being present. Later in the
day, over Bloch's objections, the judge decided to let the press
back in. 135 The result was that Exhibit 8 and Greenglass's descrip-
tion of the bomb were excluded from the trial transcript and the
scrutiny of higher court judges despite the fact that much of
Greenglass's testimony on the impounded evidence was reported
in newspapers. Lastly, rather than put the government to the task
of proving that Greenglass's data included secret information re-
lated to national defense, defense counsel volunteered to stipulate
that it did, 136 violating the cardinal rule that defense counsel should
never concede a point that prosecution has not proved.
Compared to the AEC's suggestion that the information be
"reclassified" after its disclosure in open court, Bloch's move to
have this testimony impounded was more effective in preserving
the mystique of atomic secrecy. 3 7 The jury had already heard a
distinguished expert testify how Greenglass's information accu-
rately described the development of the atomic bomb, something
no other nation had. Then the defense counsel asked that the tes-
timony be kept secret. This move helped convince the jury that the
Rosenbergs had in fact stolen the most important secret of the
atomic age. Bloch's motive for asking for the impoundment was
clear - he wanted to impress the court and the jury with the de-
fense's patriotism and concern for national security. He had no
way of judging how important the allegedly stolen information
was. He had no expert witnesses because "not one of [the scien-
tists] would speak up for fear of getting involved."'' 38 Since he
could not challenge the scientific information, he "almost had to
take the government's word.' 139 Later, perhaps realizing the effect
of his request, Bloch tried to regain some of the lost ground.
When John Derry,140 the AEC expert, authenticated Exhibit 8 by
declaring a copy of the sketches "substantially accurate, '' 44 Bloch
134 Id. at 188-89.
135 Id. at 190.
136 Id. at 186 (quoting the Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 478-79).
137 Id. at 191. Even the prosecution expressed surprise at this astonishing move by the
defense which had the effect of convincing the jury that what they were about to hear was "the
secret of the atom bomb." Id. at 189.
138 Morgan, supra note 12, at 127.
139 Id.
140 Derry was a former liaison officer who reported on the technical progress of research
and production of the bomb to General Groves, who was in charge of the Manhattan Project. Id.
141 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 222.
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tried to get Derry to admit that the sketches were by no means a
"complete" or "detailed" representation of the Nagasaki bomb.1 42
But Judge Kaufman intervened and would not allow this line of
cross-examination. 43  Kaufman offered "clarification" from the
prosecutors by asking Saypol about his theory. 4" So while Saypol
was allowed to interject his observation that the sketch had been
enough to "tip off' the Soviets," Bloch was not allowed to ask
whether the sketch could have been done by " a machinist without
any degree in engineering" on the grounds that defense was in-
dulging in "a bit of summation."'
' 45
The AEC's expert witnesses, as well as FBI Director Hoover
who had closely followed Fuchs's case, knew that there were gross
errors in the Greenglass testimony but did nothing to point this out
to the judge and jury.146 But then it was not the government's bur-
den to point out the flaws in the Greenglass testimony, and Bloch's
request for the impoundment prevented the exposure of
Greenglass's error. The government did everything "legal and il-
legal" to assure that the judge, jury, media, and public believed
that what the Rosenberg-Sobell conspirators had done was nothing
short of theft of the atomic bomb secret.147  This was partly to
remedy the shock and dismay that the government felt at the extent
of Russian infiltration through the lax security at Los Alamos.
This lax attitude stemmed from a widely believed, but mistaken,
theory, promulgated by none other than chief of the Manhattan
Project General Groves, that the Russians had no high-grade Ura-
nium ore and could not possibly make a serious effort to develop
an atomic bomb.
48
To secure a conviction, the success of the Rosenbergs con-
spiracy was not at issue. The only issue was whether they had en-
gaged in such activity with the "intent or reason to believe"'' 49 that
142 Id. (quoting the Trial Transcript, supra note 11, at 915).
'43 Id.
i id.
145 Id.
146 Gerald E. Markowitz & Michael Meeropol, The "Crime of the Century" Revisited:
David Greenglass's Scientific Evidence in the Rosenberg Case, 44 SCi. & SOCIETY 1, 22-23
(1980). General Groves, who was in charge of the Manhattan Project, told a closed meeting of
the AEC that:
I think that the data that went out in the case of the Rosenbergs was of
minor value. I would never say that publicly ... because irrespective of
the value of that [information] in the overall picture the Rosenbergs de-
served to hang, and I would not like to see anything that would make
people say General Groves thinks they didn't do much damage after all.
RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 449.
147 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 445-46.
148 See id. at 446-47.
149 See supra note 10 for the text of the Espionage Act.
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it might be to the advantage of a foreign power. However, the im-
portance of the information was the key factor in the severity of
the sentences they received. In sentencing them to death, Judge
Kaufman opined:
Putting into the hands of the Russians the A-bomb years be-
fore our best scientists predicted Russia would perfect the
bomb has already caused, in my opinion, the Communist ag-
gression in Korea, with the resultant casualties exceeding
50,000 and who knows but that millions more innocent peo-
ple may pay the price of your treason. Indeed by your be-
trayal, you undoubtedly have altered the course of history to
the disadvantage of our country.150
Even earlier, the government knew that only by demonstrating
that Rosenberg, through Greenglass, had passed crucial atomic in-
formation would the government be able to impose the death pen-
alty on Rosenberg and get him to divulge further information. In a
meeting before the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic En-
ergy, the prosecution's representative, Myles Lane, told the Com-
mittee that if Rosenberg would confess and name names, the gov-
ernment could forge ahead with the arrest of various other espio-
nage agents. Lane felt that:
the only thing that will break this man Rosenberg is the pros-
pect of a death penalty or getting the chair, plus that if we can
convict his wife, too, and give her a stiff sentence of 25 or 30
years, that combination may serve to make this fellow dis-
gorge and give us the information on these other individu-
als. "
Gordon Dean, Chairman of the AEC, explained that "Mr. Lane
feels that if you don't prove in this case that he transmitted some-
thing very vital as of 1945 .. .you certainly couldn't impose a
death penalty on the man.' 52
In 1966, when the impounded cross-sectional sketch of the
Nagasaki bomb was released, several former Los Alamos scientists
were asked to examine it. Top scientists Dr. Philip Morrison 153
150 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 284.
15' Markowitz & Meeropol, supra note 146, at 23-24 (quoting from the transcript of meet-
ing of United States Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy, February 8, 1951, at 7).
152 Id. at 24.
153 Morrison was a professor of physics at MIT and co-holder of the patent on the implo-
sion-type bomb. RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 433.
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and Dr. Henry Linschitz 54 concluded that the descriptions were
"factually incorrect" and therefore "gave a false depiction of what
is purported to be the cross-section of the atomic bomb."'55 Both
agreed that there was no such thing as a single "secret" of the
atomic bomb, 156 but that in any case, Greenglass's sketch and tes-
timony could in no way be considered to have conveyed that se-
cret. 157  Their assessments were supported by Harold Urey, J.
Robert Oppenheimer, and George Kistiakowski, all of whom had
appeared on the prosecutor's witness list before trial.15
8
In the 1990's, the opening of Soviet intelligence archives, the
revelations of a former agent, and the release of the CIA's decryp-
tion exercise revealed that while Julius Rosenberg was engaged in
espionage, he played only a minor role in Soviet atomic espionage.
Fuchs 159 and another scientist, Theodore Alvin Hall, 160 were the
ones who provided the Soviets with the "implosion" principle for
the bomb.
VI. ETHEL ROSENBERG
Perhaps the most poignant criticism of the government's be-
havior was its strategy against Ethel Rosenberg. Recently released
documents show that from the very beginning Ethel Rosenberg
154 Linschitz was a professor of chemistry at Brandeis University who had also worked in
the explosives chemistry section at Los Alamos. Id.
155 Markowitz & Meeropol, supra note 146, at 9 (quoting affidavit of Philip Morrison,
prepared for Sobell's appeal).
156 Dr. Morrison restated this view in 1973:
From 1945 on, there is certainly no Atomic secret, the secret is out.
Fission will make it work. There are thousands of little secrets...
volumes of technical skill, laboratories full of people, factories,
machinists, machines, all sorts of things. That's what it takes. It's
an industry, not a recipe.
Id. at 16.
157 Both of these scientists, however, were careful to only question the accuracy of
Greenglass's testimony rather than contending that there was no espionage at all. Radosh &
Milton provide an explanation of how the Greenglass testimony might have been of some value
to the Russians: first, that Greenglass was recruited during a gap in Fuchs's active espionage
career, and later, as a check on what Fuchs was offering and informing the Russians that the
Americans had abandoned the Uranium type bomb dropped on Hiroshima and were now settled
on the implosion-type Plutonium bomb. See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 441-42.
158 See supra note 92 and accompanying text for a discussion of Saypol's use of these
scientists' names on the witness list.
159 An FBI document summarizing the interrogation of Fuchs by FBI agents revealed that
it was Fuchs's information which gave away the real "atomic secret" of the implosion bomb.
See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 442.
160 See JOSEPH ALBRIGHT & MARCIA KUNSTEL, BOMBSHELL: THE SECRET STORY OF
AMERICAN'S UNKNOWN SPY CONSPIRACY (1997) (revealing that what Hall gave up was not
merely knowledge of the bomb's existence, but technical information that helped the Soviet
Union build a bomb years earlier than would have been possible otherwise).
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was seen not as a key accomplice of Julius but rather as a "lever"
to pressure Julius into confessing the names of other spies.
Up to the day of Julius's arrest, the FBI had no interest in
Ethel Rosenberg. When Julius failed to give FBI any information,
FBI Director Hoover made it clear that arresting Ethel would be
advantageous and serve as "lever" to induce Rosenberg to con-
fess. 16  But there was not enough evidence against Ethel, and even
when she appeared before the grand jury, they showed no interest
in indicting her.' 62 Three days after Ethel's first grand jury ap-
pearance, Saypol issued a summons to bring her before the grand
jury a second time in order "to stage her arrest under the most
dramatic circumstances possible.' 63  After she testified and was
leaving the courthouse, she was accosted by two FBI agents and
brought back into the Bureau's offices. Her arrest warrant was
issued while she was waiting in an adjoining room, her arraign-
ment followed momentarily, and bail was set at $100,000. The
U.S. Commissioner refused to delay her arrest long enough to al-
low her to make some arrangements for her sons who had been left
with a neighbor for the afternoon.' 64
The key evidence implicating Ethel Rosenberg as an accom-
plice to Julius was the testimony of David and Ruth Greenglass
that she had typed the information given to Julius by David. 65
During the six-month period between Ethel's arrest and the trial,
the FBI had failed to dig up any additional information about her.
Suddenly, ten days before trial in an interview by FBI agents, Ruth
"volunteered additional information" on Ethel - that she had typed
the information that David had given Julius. Ruth also said that at
a January 1945 dinner party Ethel had told her that she was tired
161 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 98 (quoting from a note written to the Attor-
ney General, in which J. Edgar Hoover, head of the FBI, wrote "there is no question... [that] if
Julius Rosenberg would furnish further details of his extensive espionage activities it would be
possible to proceed against other individuals .... [P]roceeding against his wife might serve as a
lever in this matter.") (emphasis added).
62 Id. at 100-01.
163 Id. at 101.
164 The sons were picked up by Ethel's mother, Tessie Greenglass, who was unable to look
after them, and before long the boys were removed to the Hebrew Children's Home in the
Bronx. Id. at 101-02.
165 Until this piece of evidence was offered, the only evidence against Ethel was two inci-
dents mentioned by Ruth. One was that Ethel had been present on the occasion of Julius's first
suggestion to Ruth to ask David to participate in a "mutual exchange of information." On this
occasion, Ethel had apparently urged Ruth to given David the message and let David decide for
himself. Id. at 162. The second event was that Ethel had been present when Julius cut up the
Jell-O box side that was used as a recognition signal. Id.
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because had been "up late" the night before typing the material
that David had just given to Julius. 16
Ethel's testimony in her defense essentially mirrored the tes-
timony of Julius; she denied all allegations of having ever engaged
in any conspiracy and refused to answer questions relating to pos-
sible communist activities on the grounds of self-incrimination.
1 67
Interestingly, Ethel's attorney Alexander Bloch was strongly
against his son and the Rosenbergs' decision to take the Fifth
Amendment on questions of their communist activities. He argued
that "since the prevailing public attitude was hostile toward anyone
'hiding behind the Fifth Amendment,' perhaps it would be best
[for Julius] to come right out and frankly admit his student mem-
bership in the YCL," especially since Julius's dismissal from the
Signal Corps on charges of Communism was bound to come up at
trial. 68 However, the Rosenbergs felt on principal that their politi-
cal ideologies were not on trial and decided to take the Fifth be-
cause to do otherwise could be used "only to turn us into informers
or to create the idea [that] all Communists are spies.
169
In the end, it was Ethel's widely reported "cold, virtually
emotionless demeanor" during her trial appearance that was
probably instrumental in turning the jury against her. She was pic-
tured as a heartless spy' 70 who "thought and felt whatever [her po-
litical commitment required] her to think and feel. '171 Saypol, in
his closing argument, condemned Ethel by describing her as strik-
ing the keys of her typewriter like a "blow by blow against her
own country, in the interests of the Soviets."'
172
166 See supra notes 110-18 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Greenglasses'
testimony regarding Ethel's typing.
'67 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
168 PHILIPSON, supra note 61, at 272 (quoting from WEXLEY, supra note 53, at 226).
169 Id. at 273 (quoting Emanuel Bloch's paraphrasing of the Rosenbergs' position reprinted
in VIRGINIA GARDNER, THE ROSENBERG STORY 98 (1954)).
170 Ethel's character has become the subject of many myths. Her expressionless face at the
trial, her loyalty to her ideals and her husband, her choice to orphan her children rather than
cooperate with the government, and her published correspondence with Julius while in prison
have all fed the myths. Those who believe that the Rosenbergs were framed by the government
characterize her acts as an enormous sacrifice made by a devoted mother in the service of some
of the highest human values and in an attempt to prevent the government from enlarging its
witch-hunt. Those who believe in the Rosenbergs' guilt see her actions as the workings of a
heartless political fanatic whose commitment to Communism outweighed her capacity for ma-
ternal feeling. For a full discussion see PHILIPSON, supra note 61. When she was first arrested,
the matrons in charge of the ninth floor of the Women's House of Detention where Ethel was
kept reported that she was devastated by her arrest, sobbing herself to sleep at night, and spend-
ing all her outside recreation time glued to a fence with the hope that she might catch a glimpse
of Julius in the nearby men's facility. See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 102.
171 PHILIPSON, supra note 61, at 2 (quoting ROBERT WARSHOW, THE IMMEDIATE EXPERI-
ENCE: MOVIES, COMICS, THEATRE & OTHER AsPcTs OF POPULAR CULTURE 80 (1962)).
172 NIZER, supra note 14, at 313.
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When it came to sentencing, the judge made the unusual step
of asking the prosecutor not to submit a formal sentencing recom-
mendation in an apparent step to be "independent" of any influ-
ence from the government or outside sources. 173  However, what
went on in the judge's chambers tells a different story. According
to Saypol, he was summoned to the judge's chambers the morning
of April 4, 195 1.174 The judge asked for Saypol's recommendation
and pressed Saypol to find out what the FBI thought the judge
should do. 175 He urged Saypol to go to Washington that same day
to discuss the matter. To the judge's irritation, he found that nei-
ther Ford, the Deputy Attorney General, nor Mclnerney, chief of
the DOJ's criminal division, nor even FBI Director Hoover were in
favor of imposing a death sentence on Ethel.176 When Saypol re-
ported this serious opposition, Kaufman found the news so dis-
tressing that he had Saypol call Ford on the phone in his presence
and confirm Washington's position. 177 After hearing Saypol's nar-
ration of the Washington position, Kaufman asked Saypol to re-
frain from making any recommendation for punishment in the
course of his closing argument the next day. 178 Radosh & Milton
explain Kaufman's decision not to hear Saypol's recommendation
as follows: fearing that Washington's ideas would influence Say-
pol's statements in court, the judge did not wish to have it known
that his sentence went beyond what the government thought advis-
able. 179
After her sentence, Ethel was immediately removed to the
Sing Sing "death house" prison in upstate New York where she
173 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 276. The judge had also participated in a num-
ber of highly irregular ex parte communications with the prosecution before the trial began. For
example, even before the start of trial, there is an entry in the AEC chairman's diary stating that
"Mclnerney [chief of the Department of Justice's criminal division] said there is no indication
[of confession] at this point and he doesn't think there will be unless we get a death sentence.
He talked to the judge and he is prepared to impose one if the evidence warrants." Id. at 277
(quoting Gordon Dean Diary, Feb. 7, 1951, AEC files).
174 See id. at 278-79 (quoting letter from Irving Saypol to Clarence Kelley (1975)).
175 id.
176 While Ford was against sending a woman to the electric chair, the FBI's reasons were
based on public opinion and the fear that "a psychological reaction [on the part] of the public"
would reflect badly on the FBI, Justice, and entire government. Id. at 280 (quoting memoran-
dum from J. Edgar Hoover to his aides Tolson, Ladd, Belmont, and Nichols (April 2, 1951)).
' Id. at 279.
178 Id. at 281.
179 Id. at 281-82. Released DOJ papers also show that the judge, before passing on a mo-
tion by the Rosenbergs for a reduction of sentence, considered evidence not presented at trial.
This "evidence," about the existence of the Rosenberg spy-ring, was incorporated in a secret
Justice Department memorandum and was based mainly on the reports of a jail-house informant
of Rosenberg to the FBI. Id. at 317 (quoting "Top Secret" memorandum with cover letter from
U.S. Attorney Myles Lane to Daniel M. Lyons, Esq., Pardons Attorney, the President's Office
(Jan. 14, 1953)).
1082 [Vol. 53:1057
THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST TWO
was kept in solitary confinement for two years without frequent
contacts with her attorney or the possibility of visits with her hus-
band. Manny Bloch charged that such government action "was a
cruel attempt to break her."'
180
With the passage of time and the "theory" that it was Ethel
and not Julius who was the stronger of the two and the "master-
mind" behind the spy ring, FBI Director Hoover and President Ei-
senhower became determined that Ethel's death was justified., l
But for many Americans as well as the rest of the world, her death
sentence came as a shock, especially since the double execution
would orphan the Rosenberg children overnight.
After the trial and while the appeal was still pending, the FBI
came across information supplied by a secret informer that Julius
himself had been the one who typed material and that in order to
alleviate the noise, he would place rubber caps under the type-
writer table legs and would have the bathroom tap running. 8 2 The
FBI, however, never mentioned this information in the Bureau's
summary report.183 On the day before the Rosenberg executions, a
carload of FBI agents set up a secret command post in the prison
warden's garage, ready to relay the contents of an interrogation of
either Julius or Ethel should either of them show signs of wanting
to confess. 184 There were carefully planned procedures for how to
stop the execution "if the Rosenbergs desire to talk after they go
into the execution chamber and even after they are strapped into
the chair."' 85 The contents of the one of the FBI's memos, dated
June 17, 1953, makes for shocking reading. Among the list of
questions FBI agents were to ask Julius was only one question
concerning Ethel. It read "Was your wife cognizant of your activi-
ties?"'t8 6 The U.S. government was about to execute Ethel as a
"full-fledged partner" in her husband's crimes when the FBI was
not sure if she was even aware of Julius's espionage activities.
180 Id. at 296.
181 For example, in a personal letter to Professor Clyde Miller, Eisenhower wrote that Ethel
did not deserve leniency because she was "the more strong-minded and the apparent leader of
the two." Id. at 78 (quoting letter from Eisenhower to Clyde Miller, "Personal and Confiden-
tial" (June 10, 1953) (Eisenhower Library)). In another letter to his son, Eisenhower wrote "[In
this case it is the woman who is the string and recalcitrant character, the man who is the weak
one. She has obviously been the leader in everything they did in the spy ring." Id. at 379.
Ironically, this characterization of Ethel stemmed from the mock "psychological report" of
Morris Ernst, the ACLU leader, as well as rumors spread by FBI Director Hoover. Id.
182 Id. at 169.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 416.
185 Id. (quoting memoramdum from Ladd to Hoover (June 15, 1953)).
186 Id. at 417 (quoting memorandum from W.A. Branigan to A.H. Belmont (June 17,
1953)).
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VII. SENTENCED UNDER THE WRONG STATUTE
Finally, the most persuasive argument for a mistrial, and the
one that led to Justice Douglas's stay of execution, challenged the
power of the district court to impose the death sentence on the
Rosenbergs. 187 Since the government's indictment alleged con-
spiracy that had continued until 1950, the indictment and sentenc-
ing should have been under the Atomic Energy Act of 1946188
(AEA). That statute was passed in order to "ameliorate the penal-
ties imposed for disclosing atomic secrets.' 89 Thus for a death
sentence under the AEA, there had to be not only an intent to give
an advantage to a foreign power, but also an intent to injure the
United States. Moreover, the Act allowed judges to impose the
death penalty only where a jury had so recommended. In his opin-
ion, Douglas briefly stated that the AEA may apply in this case
because (1) "the offense charged was a conspiracy commencing
before but continuing after the date of the new Act"; (2) "although
the overt acts alleged were committed in 1944 and in 1945, the
Government's case showed acts of the Rosenbergs' in pursuit of
the conspiracy long after the new Act became effective" (quoting
from the Government's brief in opposition to the petition of the
Rosenbergs for cert); and (3) that the "proof against ... [the]
Rosenbergs extended well beyond the effective date of the act."'' 9
He explained that he had granted his stay to give counsel for both
sides more time to prepare arguments on this issue. 191 Two other
justices agreed that under the canons of construction, if two stat-
utes are in effect as of the date of sentencing, a court should im-
pose sentence under the less harsh statute, especially since the later
1946 Act "barred the imposition of the death penalty by district
judges acting without a jury's recommendation."'' 92 The day after
Douglas issued his stay, the Supreme Court, in a Special Term
called at the prosecution's request, vacated the Douglas stay. The
opinion stated that the Constitution prohibited passage of any ex
post facto act and that the AEA did not supercede the earlier Es-
pionage Act. 193
Had the judge asked for the jury's recommendation, there is
strong evidence that at least Ethel would not have received a death
17 See infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text for a discussion of Douglas's last minute
stay and its aftermath.
188 42 U.S.C. § 1810 (1946).
189 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 317 (1953).
190 Id. at 318-19.
191 ld. at 320.
192 Id. at 299 (Black, J., dissenting).
193 Id.
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sentence. There was at least one juror who was strongly opposed
to the possibility of Ethel receiving a death sentence. 94 But when
this juror asked the judge whether he could recommend leniency
for one of the defendants, Judge Kaufman told the jury that pun-
ishment was not their concern and that the thought of such recom-
mendation should not in any way affect their decision as to
whether or not to convict.
95
More importantly, many feel that the Rosenbergs were tried
for espionage but sentenced for treason.'96  In his opening state-
ment, Saypol linked Communism with treason, a shrewd trial tac-
tic that not only ensured a high level of media coverage,' 97 but also
equated, in the jury's minds, conspiracy to commit espionage with
treason. Indeed, the judge himself referred to treason in his re-
marks accompanying the sentence.1 98 But the Soviet Union was not
at war with the United States at the time of the alleged theft of
atomic secrets. Since the Rosenbergs were not helping an "en-
emy," they were not guilty of treason.
The standard of proof in a trial for treason is very stringent.
The Constitution's Treason Clause requires that "two independent
witnesses" testify to each and every overt act cited in the charge.'
99
This was not the case in the Rosenbergs' trial, as none of the overt
acts were corroborated by two independent witnesses. On the
other hand, the standard of proof for a conspiracy charge convic-
tion are very minimal. 200  Not only is hearsay testimony of fellow
conspirators admissible, but each conspirator may be held liable
for the acts of all others, whether or not he had specific knowledge
of them. Lastly, it was not necessary to prove that the conspirators
194 As late as 1975, the holdout juror felt that if he had held out successfully, Ethel
Rosenberg's life could have been saved and that this was a "burden" he still carried. Morgan,
supra note 12, at 109.
'95 Id. at 131.
96 See, e.g. Parrish, supra note 53, at 816. Parish quotes Justice Frankfurter's notes report-
ing that Justice Black thought the treason clause issues were serious, and that "the fact that a
death sentence had been imposed in time of peace for what was in effect a charge of treason...
without observance of the constitutional requirement . . . presented a serious question." Id.
Parish also quotes Justice Burton's notes indicating that he felt the same way. Id.
197 See NEVILLE, supra note 59, at 35-51 (discussing the agenda setting role of Saypol's
tactics and news coverage of the trial).
198 See supra note 150.
199 "Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in
adhering to the Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Trea-
son unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open
Court." U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 1.
200 So much so that a charge of conspiracy had been called "the last resort of the people" or
"the prosecutor's friend." RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 173.
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had actually succeeded in their plans,2°' only that they had con-
spired together towards a common end.2°2
VIII. THE APPELLATE REVIEWS AND SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
After the sentence, the Rosenbergs' execution was stayed
pending appeals. In February 1952, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction.2 3 In June 1952, the U.S. Su-
preme Court refused for the first time to review the case, 2°4 and in
November 1952, it denied a petition for rehearing. 20 5 In December
1952, Bloch's motion for a new trial based on Schneider's perjury
and Saypol's conduct 206 was denied without formal hearing or oral
testimony 2°7 and was affirmed by the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.20 8 Bloch's motion for reduction of the sentence as "cruel
and unusual punishment" was also denied. In January 1953, the
execution was stayed pending review by President Truman. Tru-
man left office on January 20, and incoming President Eisenhower
refused clemency.
During this time, the National Committee to Secure Justice in
the Rosenberg Case had gained momentum. Appeals for clemency
included ones from Albert Einstein and the Pope.20 9 Three million
letters and telegrams flooded the White House. The third execu-
tion date was stayed pending Supreme Court action. The Supreme
Court for a second time refused to grant certiorari.2
In April 1953, two pieces of "new evidence" were found: the
missing console table and several documents stolen from David
Greenglass's lawyer's file hinting at various inconsistencies in
Greenglass's testimony.21 On June 6, 1953, Bloch made a motion
for a new trial based on the new evidence. On June 8, Kaufman
denied the motion. The Rosenbergs' execution was scheduled for
June 18th. On June 11, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals an-
201 The court had properly ruled that "the crime was transmitting classified data to a for-
eign government, and whether such material was highly useful or not did not matter." NIZER,
supra note 14, at 163. However, the usefulness of the information certainly affected the degree
of punishment. The court, in this case, attributed fifty thousand deaths in Korea to Russia's
knowledge of the atom bomb and held the Rosenbergs directly responsible for that knowledge.
Id.
202 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 173-74.
203 United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1952).
204 Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 838 (1952).
205 Rosenberg v. United States, 344 U.S. 889 (1952).
206 In particular, Saypol's statement to the press at the time of William Perl's arrest.
207 United States v. Rosenberg, 108 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
208 United States v. Rosenberg, 200 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1952).
209 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 377.
210 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 965 (1953).
211 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 361-72.
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nounced that it would affirm Kaufman's decision without hearing
oral arguments on the motion itself or on Bloch's application for a
stay of execution. On June 12, an application for stay of execution
was presented to Justice Jackson. That weekend Jackson failed to
persuade Justice Douglas to provide the crucial vote, and on June
15, the last session of the 1952 Term, five justices of the Supreme
Court (including Douglas) voted against a stay of execution that
would have given the defense time to prepare a formal argument
on the "new evidence" issue. 12
On June 15, the day before they were scheduled to disperse
for the summer, the Supreme Court justices heard a last minute but
powerful oral argument based on a writ of habeas corpus by John
H. Finerty, and it denied certiorari for a third time.213 The same
day, Judge Kaufman rejected Irwin Edelmen's "next friend" peti-
tion for a stay of execution. The next morning, the "next friend"
team, in a desperate attempt to find a higher court judge, managed
to secure an appointment with Justice Douglas and argued that the
Rosenbergs had been convicted under the wrong act.214 On the
morning of June 17, Douglas stayed the execution.215 The next
day, Chief Justice Vinson called the Court back into an unprece-
dented special session and with Black, Douglas, and Frankfurter
dissenting, vacated the Douglas stay.21 6 In order to avoid the Jew-
ish Sabbath, the time of execution was brought forward from
11:00 p.m. on Friday, June 19, and the Rosenbergs were executed
at 8:00 p.m. just before sundown.
Public support for the Rosenbergs was largely organized by
the National Committee to Secure Justice in the Rosenberg Case,
founded by Emily Alman and her husband, two residents of the
housing complex where the Rosenbergs lived.2t 7 Alman did not
212 Rosenberg v. United States, 345 U.S. 989 (1953). The Court also denied a pending
petition for a rehearing as to the May 25, 1953, denial of certiorari. Rosenberg v. United States,
345 U.S. 1003 (1953).
213 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 271 (1953). Finerty was already famous for his
role, albeit unsuccessful, in petitioning the Supreme Court to overthrow the convictions of
Sacco and Vinzetti, and for his role in the landmark case of Mooney v. Holahan, 294 U.S. 103
(1935), where the Supreme Court held that knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecu-
tion constitutes a violation of the defendant's due process rights. RADOSH & MILTON, supra
note 16, at 397.
214 See supra Part VII for a discussion of this point.
215 Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, 313-20 (1953).
216 Id. at 288-89. For a full discussion of Douglas's key role in the Supreme Court's re-
fusal to review the Rosenberg's case, see Michael E. Parrish, Revisited: The Rosenberg "Atom
Spy" Case, 68 UMKC L. REV. 601 (2000). Parrish also makes the point that if the Rosenberg
case had remained before the courts until 1954, they would probably have been spared. By then
the Korean War was over, McCarthy had been censured by the Senate, and Earl Warren had
replaced Fred Vinson as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.
217 See RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 322.
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know the Rosenbergs but became interested when reading a series
of articles printed in the National Guardian focusing on their
plight. These articles started the suspicion that the Rosenbergs
were victims of American "fascism" and were framed by the gov-
ernment.218 By November 1952, the effort had gone international
with Committee branches in Britain, France, Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Ireland, Israel,
and Eastern Europe.2 19  The Committee's success made govern-
ment officials all the more determined to press for a hasty resolu-
tion.
Interestingly, the ACLU and American Jewish Committee
(AJC) gave no support to the Committee's activities, partly be-
cause they were eager to score points with the U.S. government
and to dissociate themselves from "any taint of Red.",220 In fact,
the AJC not only declined to join in the call for clemency, but also
became an open advocate of the death penalty because of fears that
the Jewishness of so many of the atom spies would provoke an
anti-Semitic reaction.22' Similarly, the ACLU "strengthened itself
against attacks from the Right by placing itself on the record as
staunchly anti-communist. ' '222 It was revealed in 1977 that ACLU
leaders gave the FBI names of pro-Communist members in local
affiliates and even passed on reports of ACLU meetings.223 More
distressing was evidence that Morris Ernst, the ACLU co-counsel,
hoped to use his reputation as a civil libertarian to join the
Rosenberg defense camp where he could covertly serve the interest
of the FBI by getting Rosenberg to confess. 22 4 Ernst later declared
that he had conducted a "psychological study of the Rosenbergs"
and had concluded that "Julius is the slave and his wife, Ethel, the
master" despite the fact that he had never spoken to the Rosen-
218 Id. at 322-23.
219 Id. at 347. Radosh & Milton attribute the rise in pro-Rosenberg sentiment, both in the
US and abroad, to a sudden reversal in the Communist party's "silence" or "blackout' on the
Rosenberg issue. Id. at 348-49 ("[A]fter ignoring the Rosenbergs for more than two years...
the Party suddenly [made] their case the focus of a major international propaganda campaign" in
order to deflect attention from the Slansky purge trial (and execution) of fourteen former leaders
of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party which threatened to "tear apart the Communist parties
of Western Europe"). Id. at 352.
220 Id.
221 Id. Rabbi S. Andhill Fineberg went through considerable efforts to expose the Com-
munist infiltration of the Committee to Secure Justice and published his findings in the book
THE ROSENBERG CASE: FACT AND FICTION (1953). Kilsheimer reviewed prepublication copies
of the manuscript, and the President's cabinet decided to promote Fineberg's book. See RA-
DOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 553-55.
222 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 355 (citing MARY SPERLING MCAULIFFE, CRISIS
ON THE LEFr: COLD WAR POLITICS AND AMERICAN LIBERALS 89-107 (1978)).
223 Id. at 356.
224 Id. at 357-58.
1088 [Vol. 53:1057
THE GOVERNMENT AGAINST TWO
bergs.225 This view of the couple took hold; the "psychological
study" found its way into official reports, statements by the attor-
ney general, and Eisenhower's personal correspondence and pro-
vided justification for the execution of Ethel.226
Released FBI and Department of Justice confidential docu-
ments showed that Judge Kaufman had participated in highly ir-
regular ex parte communications with the prosecution before pass-
ing sentence.227 Even before the start of trial, there is an entry in
the AEC chairman's diary stating that "McInerney [chief of Jus-
tice's criminal division] said there is no indication [of confession]
at this point[,] and he doesn't think there will be unless we get a
death sentence. He talked to the judge[,] and he is prepared to
impose one if the evidence warrants.228  Other sources include
FBI documents, indicating that Kaufman consulted with various
individuals including Roy Cohn, assistant prosecutor, and Saypol
after the jury's verdict.229 He had also considered evidence, not
produced at trial, about the existence of the Rosenberg spy-ring
before passing on a motion for a reduction of sentence. 230
More incredibly, the FBI files show that Chief Justice Vinson
had met with Jackson and Attorney General Herbert Bromwell on
June 16 and agreed ahead of time to call the special session should
Douglas stay the execution.
231
CONCLUSION
After the release of government files in the United States and
the former Soviet Union, there is compelling evidence that Julius
Rosenberg was a spy. Although he was an amateur, Julius man-
aged to become the coordinator of an extensive espionage opera-
tion with contacts well placed to pass on information on top-secret
military projects in the fields of radar and aeronautics. Ethel
probably knew of, and supported, her husband's activities. But the
Rosenberg spy ring was not the source of atomic information to
Soviet Russia, and the government was aware of this fact at the
time of their trial. As commentators have pointed out, the Rosen-
225 Id. at 358.
226 Id.
227 See supra notes 173-79 and accompanying text.
228 RADOSH & MILTON, supra note 16, at 277 (quoting Gordon Dean Diary, Feb. 7, 1951,
AEC files) (emphasis added).
229 Id. at 277-79.
230 This "evidence" was incorporated in a secret Justice Department memorandum and was
based mainly on the reports of a jail-house informant of Rosenberg to the FBI. Id. at 317 (quot-
ing "Top Secret" memorandum with cover letter from U.S. Attorney Myles Lane to Daniel M.
Lyons, Esq., Pardons Attorney, the President's Office (Jan. 14, 1953)).
231 Id. at 403.
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bergs served as "scapegoats, condemned to death less because of
the nature and seriousness of their crime than because, at a particu-
lar moment in time, their deaths served a cathartic function - for
Communists and anti-Communists alike. 232
Many may find that the government's tactics were justified
given the final proof that Julius Rosenberg was a spy. But the
Rosenbergs' guilt or innocence should have no bearing on the due
process they were entitled to. Similarly, we must strive to prevent
the current atmosphere from providing justification for the gov-
ernment's departure from the constitutional rights of defendants.
ATOSSA M. ALAVIt
232 ld. at 448.
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